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Motivation -- Deterrence’s Difficulty
Committing Offences 
including Illegal Access/ 
Interception, Data/System 
Interference, etc.
Production, Distribution 
and Possession of 
Computer Misuse Tools 
with Offensive Intent
Criminalize 
Computer Misuse
Criminalize 
Offences
Perpetration cost advantage:
Automation and reachability
Lower knowledge barrier to 
acquire hacking techniques 
via online communities
Enforcement cost disadvantage:
Invisibility and anonymity
Jurisdictional boundary
Judicial determination of CM:
the legal system need to take 
ex-ante adjudication of the 
malice and severity of hacking 
tools which may vary with the 
context where the act will be 
committed.
List of Computer Misuse Act (CMA)
Country Law Amendment 
Australia Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 478.3 and 478.4 
Croatia New Criminal Law Article 272 
Canada Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act Section 342.2 
China Criminal Code Article 285 
Colombia Penal Code Act 1273 of 2009 Article 269A-J 
Ethiopia Telecom Fraud Offence Proclamation Article 3 
Fiji Crimes Decree 2009 Article 346 
France Monetary and Financial Code Article L163-4 
Germany German Criminal Code Acts 202c 
Italy Penal Code Art 615 
Netherlands Dutch Criminal Code Article 350a 
New Zealand Crimes Amendment Act 2013 (2013 No 27) subsection 1 of 251 
Qatar Cybercrime Law (No. 14 of 2014) Article 66 
Russia Criminal Code Act 273 and 138.1 
Serbia Criminal Code Article 304a 
Singapore Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act Article 10(1) 
Sweden Criminal Code Article 9b 
Switzerland Criminal Code Article 143bis 
United Kingdom Computer Misuse Act (UK) s1, s3, s3A and s3ZA 
United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (a)(5)(A) 
 
UK: The Computer Misuse Act 1990: 
Section 3A: Making, supplying or obtaining articles 
for use in an offence under Section 1,3 or 3ZA
US: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: (a)(5)(A)
China: Criminal Code: the Amended Article 285
Motivation – Deterrence or Chilling Effect?
illegal legal
Judicial determination of CM:
• Legal system with fallibility and uncertainty
• Predict potential cybersecurity risks associated with new 
technology or new uses of existing technology 
• Dual use nature of cybersecurity technology: tools for 
penetration tests; cryptocurrency
• Unfalsifiability of security claims 
• Ten to fifteen thousand proxies in a list [ip:port].
• How to change your ip in less then 1 minute
• Anonymity complete GUIDE By Theraider & 
Dangerous R.
• Ping Scan Script 
• My python password finder for any site!
• Easily Hackable important Website :)
• [The Order] Free Rat Support | Reliable |
Quick and Easy | 2+ Years of Experience
• Hacking A College
• DDoS Service [Cheap] [Powerful]
• How to Know when you are infected with RATs 
or Keyl0ggers.
• How to protect your HTML source code
• How to stop people from resolving your IP via 
Skype
• Nexus anti-flood 2010 with DDOS protection!
Offensive intent Defensive intentNeutral intent
Criminalized Prosecution Threat Protected
Motivation – Concerns on Chilling Effect
• Cost of Chilling Effect:
• Defamation vs. Free Speech
• Government surveillance vs. Privacy
• Cybersecurity Offense vs. Defense 
• Empirical Challenge of Chilling effects
• Where to find a control group?
• Lack of individual-level data to track a choice between different 
intents
• Globalized activities
• Shift in norms
• External Shock: CMA enforcement -- the production, distribution, and possession of 
hacking tools with offensive intent
• Context: Publicly accessible online hacker communities
ØWhile the CMA enforcement explicitly imposes legal risk on the communication 
with offensive intent, would the supposition of this deterrence effect lead to the 
chilling effect on the sharing with neutral intent or even defensive intent?
ØHow would the online social community context reinforce or weaken the effects of 
CMA enforcement?
Research Questions -- Empirical Evidence of Chilling Effect
Offensive intent Defensive intentNeutral intent
Criminalized
Prosecution threat
Deterrence Effect? Chilling Effect? Chilling / Substitution Effect?
Protected
Research Context -- Hacker Forums operated in the surface web
• Moral ambiguity leads to the coexistence of black/grey/white hats in online 
hacker communities, and discussions on offense, defense or neutral-intent 
techniques with dual use (Thomas 2005)
• Dual roles
• A stepping stone towards more serious online cyber-attacks (Pastrana et al. 
2018)
• A school for white hats and grey hats to understand hacking techniques 
(Kirsch 2014).
• Not for the most malicious activities but less determined hackers or the curious 
(Pastrana et al. 2018)
as vantage points for diversified intents
Research Context -- Chinese Hacker Forums
• CMA enforcement -- February 28, 2009, the Amendment of Article 285 
in the Criminal Law
• Language barrier and Internet access filtering lead to localized subjects 
and their limited mobility
• hackforums.net was not accessible in China
• The earliest Chinese dark web was launched in October 2014
• Two top forums
• Ranked the 2nd and 3rd  (Alexa.comàChinaà Computers/Security à Hacker , 
April 05, 2017)
• 89.4%~92.6% of the users geographically located in China
-- The majority of the forum participants are within the jurisdictional 
scope of the CMA enforcement
Context and Data: Author Intent Classification
Manual Labelling 
• Two human coders after 6 months of 
training 
• 25% of leading posts in each year:
• Forum A: 38,736 / 165,870
• Forum B: 12,093 / 52,154
• 50,827 consistently labelled records
• inter-rater agreement: 0.87 for Forum 
A and 0.92 for Forum B 
Unsupervised Clustering 
based on semantic cliques 
precision recall F1
irrelevant 0.98 0.99 0.98
defensive 0.95 0.94 0.94
offensive 0.96 0.93 0.95
neutral 0.94 0.90 0.92
NLP-CNN model
Exploratory knowledge
4 word embedding clusters à
4 categories of contribution intents
The training and testing 
datasets 
Preliminary Analysis
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Content Volume defensive
offensive
neutral
CMA 
enforcement
Before 
Enforcement
After 
Enforcement
The number of 
leading posts 137,718 80,306
The number of 
replies per leading 
post
7.53 10.09
% of defensive 
leading posts 6.62% 12.63%
% of offensive 
leading posts 8.78% 5.84%
% of neutral 
leading posts 3.67% 3.59%
% of irrelevant 
leading posts 80.97% 77.86% 
Quasi-Difference-In-Difference
AfterCMAt ´ Offensiveit
-0.0248***
(0.0002)
AfterCMAt ´ Defensiveit
0.0262***
(0.0002)
AfterCMAt ´ Neutralit
-0.0273***
(0.0002)
Adjusted R-squared 0.1038
No. of observations 2,826,232
A reduced-form regression on the number of posts in different categories {defensive, 
offensive, neutral, irrelevant} generated by hacker forum user i in month t (Marthews & 
Tucker 2017)
Limitations
q Inflation with many zero observations
q User’s contribution intent decision 
interdependent within each user 
q Contribution on security-irrelevant posts is 
correlated with security-related posts 
q No way to address forum self-regulation on 
obviously illegal posts
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A Mixed Nested Logit Model
Each choice occasion: whether to post and which to post
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U Age Age AfterCMA Experience Attention
Peer AfterCMA Experience AfterCMA Attention
AfterCMA Peer Other Post
X Wijk
Randomized heterogeneity 
across contributors on 
preference and life cycle
Probability of being removed by forum self-regulation
Probability of {Offensive, Neutral, Defensive} post
Probability of post
Deterrence Effect
Substitution Effect
Weakened
Weakened
Reinforced
Reinforced
Reinforced
Weakened
Chilling Effect
Reinforced
Reinforced
Reinforced
• Diminishing marginal perpetration cost
• Increasing severity
• Increasing enforcement cost
• Diminishing marginal utility
• Increasing utility
• Increasing utility
• Increasing probability of erroneous 
prosecution
• Exemplified perceived risk associated 
with social interaction (Kasperson et 
al. 1988 )
Robustness and Falsification Tests
• Subsamples by varying size or varying user activeness
• Alternative Models Fitness
• Alternative explanations related to 
• Competing peer forums (impacts on different contribution intent)
• 3 major vulnerability disclosure forums 
• Shifting norms on forum users’ topic preferences
• Global or National Google Trends Index of 30 cybersecurity keywords 
• If the enforcement is assumed six months in advance?
• If the enforcement did not occur at all? 
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Substitution effect on defensive content
marginal effect
coefficient (beta)
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Deterrence effect on offensive content
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A Counterfactual Scenario without 
CMA Enforcement
Varying Sample Size
Research Implications
• Initial empirical evidence of chilling effect of the CMA enforcement
• Chilling effect could be strengthened in online communities
• Domestic legislation may deter publicly-observable cybercrimes when 
the illegal activities are localized due to language barrier and internet 
accessibility control (Png et al. 2008)
• Deterrence effect may be weakened due to the diminishing marginal 
cost associated with experienced perpetrators and the increasing 
enforcement cost associated with the number of perpetrators (Katyal
1997)
• Positive substitution effect of domestic enforcement on promoting 
security defense as a result of the dual use nature of hacking techniques 
and the contribution incentives on the online social communities (Png et 
al. 2008)
Practical Implications
• The balance between deterrence and chilling effects 
• Cost disadvantage of the traditional security measures, e.g., investment and 
enforcement in tackling the never-ending cybersecurity risks
• The importance of information sharing among the communities consisting of 
white/grey/black hats
• Forum administrators: feasible measures to promote the positive loop 
for cybersecurity in online hacker forums. 
• Increase public attention to both offensive posts and defensive posts. (Yue et 
al. 2019)
• Increase the incremental benefit of defensive content contribution

